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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
OBLIGATIONS
H. Alston Johnson, 111*
LEsION BEYOND MOIETY
Sales of Incorporeal Immovables
In Dunckelman v. Central Louisiana Electric Co.,' plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment that they had a cause of action against
defendant electric company to rescind the agreement in which they
conveyed to defendant a right-of-way across their land for construc-
tion of an electric transmission line, on grounds of lesion beyond
moiety. The trial court sustained an exception of no cause of action
and dismissed plaintiffs' suit. The appellate court affirmed, and the
Louisiana supreme court denied writs.
All parties agreed that the conveyance in question granted to
defendant a servitude across plaintiffs' land. Both the trial court and
the appellate court concluded that a servitude of this type is an
immovable, not by nature or destination, but by disposition of
law-by the object to which it is applied.2 Thus both courts con-
cluded that the servitude was an incorporeal immovable. To this
point, there is nothing remarkable about the case or the opinion.
However, both courts went on to conclude that the Civil Code
does not authorize an action for lesion beyond moiety when the thing
sold is an immovable by the object to which it is applied. The princi-
pal authority cited to support this principle is article 1862 of the Civil
Code, which states:
Lesion can be alleged by persons of full age in no other sale
than one for immovables, in which is included whatever is im-
movable by destination.3
From this statement, the court reasoned that immovables by disposi-
tion of law were excluded: "Since the sale of immovables by destina-
tion was expressly included in the article providing for lesion in the
1825 and 1870 Codes, we believe that the redactors of those codes
*Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 291 So. 2d 914 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 294 So. 2d 827 (La. 1974);
but see id. (Barham. J., dissenting from the refusal to grant a writ).
2. LA. CIv. CODE art, 463: "There are things immovable by their nature, others
by their destination, and others by the object to which they are applied."
3. The corresponding article in the Code of 1825 read: "Lesion can be alleged by
persons of full age in no other sale than one for immovables, by which is meant
whatever is immovable by destination, including slaves, when sold with the planta-
tions on which they labour." La. Civ. Code art. 1856 (1825).
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intended to exclude the third type of immovables i.e., immovables by
disposition of law, from rescission on that ground." 4
In further support of its conclusion, the court noted that al-
though article 1862 of our Code has no counterpart in the French Civil
Code, articles 2589, 2591, and 2592, which also concern lesion beyond
moiety, do have counterparts and that these articles refer to "immov-
able estate" or "estate," citing Professor Yiannopoulos for the propo-
sition that the word "estate" means "a distinct corporeal immov-
able." 5
With deference, it is suggested that the court has put an unneces-
sarily narrow interpretation on the lesion articles and has in fact
reached a conclusion directly opposite of that obtaining in France. In
fact, the significant majority of French jurists long ago concluded
that lesion applies to sales of all three types of immovables-those
which are immovable by nature, those immovable by destination,
and those immovable by the object to which they are applied.'
Baudry-Lacantinerie in particular cites the discussions of the projet
of the French Civil Code and notes that for various reasons, the action
was not applied to movables. But instead of narrowing the definition
of immovables, a phrase was used which demonstrated, according to
Baudry-Lacantinerie, that lesion was to apply to "everything which
is not movable. 7 He concludes that the action is applicable not only
to sales of things which are immovable by their nature, but "also to
those of things which are immovable by the object to which they are
4. 291 So. 2d at 917.
5. Id. at 917-18, citing Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles:
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1 (1968). The court also cited two
Louisiana supreme court decisions which are discussed in the text.accompanying notes
22-25 infra.
6. 19 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET SAIGNAT, TRAIT9 DE DROIT CIVIL: DE LA VENTE ET DE
L'VCHANGE n* 678-80 (3d ed. 1908) [hereinafter cited as BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE]; 2
GUILLOUARD, TRAITAS DE LA VENTE ET DE L'ECHANGE n
° 686 (2d ed. 1891) [hereinafter
cited as GUILLOUARDI; 6 MARCADE, EXPLICATION THgORIQUE. ET PRATIQUE DU CODE
NAPOLEON n 0 1674 (5th ed. 1852) [hereinafter cited as MARCADE]; 2 TROPLONG, LE
DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUit: DE LA VENTE n o 793 (5th ed. 1856) [hereinafter cited as
TROPLONG].
7. "Quoi qu'il en soit des motifs, il est certain que Ia rescision pour l6sion n'est
applicable a aucune vente de meubles, importants ou non importants, corporels ou
incorporels. Nous avons, disait Portalis dans son rapport au Corps lgislatif, absolu-
ment born6 l'action rescisoire A la vente des choses immobilires.
"S'il n'y a pas A faire de distinction entre les meubles pour en 6carter l'action en
rescision pour cause de lesion, il n'y a pas davantage A en faire entre les immeubles
pour appliquer cette action aux ventes dont ils sont l'objet. En se servant de
l'expression choses immobilibres, Portalis a montr6 que l'action rescisoire devait
s'appliquer A tout ce qui n'est pas mobilier." BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE 713-14.
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applied, such as servitudes ... ."I The other authors cited are of the
same opinion.9
Granted for the moment that the French take a different view,
this certainly does not mean that we in Louisiana should capitulate.
It would not be the first time, nor the last, that our Code directly, or
our jurisprudence indirectly, would run counter to French legislation
or jurisprudence. But the difference should lead us to question
whether our Code clearly requires such a result. It is submitted that
it does not.
The only specific explanation of "immovables" which are subject
to the action is in article 1862 of our Code, which as we have seen,
adds the phrase "in which is included whatever is immovable by
destination" to the general statement that sales of "immovables" are
subject to the action. From this, the court concludes that the expres-
sion that immovables by destination are included compels the result
that immovables by the object to which they are applied are
excluded.'" Under that reasoning, it would also be logical to argue
that since immovables by nature are not specifically included, they
are also excluded. To avoid this result, the court cites article 462 as
an indication that the word "immovables" means only those which
are immovable by nature, since that article states: "Immovable
things are, in general, such as can not either move themselves or be
removed from one place to another. But this definition, strictly
speaking, is applicable only to such things as are immovable by their
own nature, and not to such as are so only by the disposition of the
law." In fact, article 462 does not purport to define immovables; it
simply states the truism that "in general" immovable things are
those which neither move nor can be removed from one place to
another. "Naturally," such things are immovable. Article 463 then
defines immovables in the "legal" as opposed to "general" sense to
include the objects described by article 462 as well as those made
immovable by destination or by the object to which they apply."
8. "Par consdquent, cette action est applicable, non seulement aux ventes
d'immeubles par leur nature, mais aussi A celles d'immeubles par l'objet auquel ils
s'appliquent, tels que les servitudes .... Id. at 714.
9. There are a few dissenters to this point of view. TROPLONG 293 mentions Duran-
ton and Zachariae. But Troplong quickly adds that there is a "manifest error" in their
opinion, which he feels he "should correct, because it will lead to misleading results."
Id. To do so, he cites article 526 of the French Civil Code, which has a counterpart in
article 471 of the Louisiana Civil Code, and which specifically includes servitudes
among those things which are immovable by disposition of law and thus in his opinion
makes them subject to the action for lesion beyond moiety.
10. 291 So. 2d at 917.
11. See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 475, which appears to draw the line between
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It is important to notice that prior to its amendment in 1870,
article 1862 included these words following the word "immovables":
"by which is meant whatever is immovable by destination, including
slaves, when sold with the plantations on which they labour."'' The
French text of that article reveals that the phrase might better be
translated: "in which group one ought to include everything that is
immovable by destination, and even slaves. . . ."I' This translation
indicates much more clearly that the intention of the redactors was
to specify that the word "immovables" was to be taken in its broad
sense, even to the point of including a category of people who could
in no way be said to fit the ordinary definition of an immovable. The
emphasis seems to have been on including things of value."
The court further attempts to buttress its conclusion that lesion
applies only to corporeal immovables by citing articles 2589, 2591,
and 2592 of the Louisiana Civil Code and correctly noting that these
articles refer to "an immovable estate,"'5 "the immovable estate,"'"
and "the estate,"'" respectively, and citing the Yiannopoulos article
movables and immovables so as to include incorporeal things classified by the law as
immovable: "All things corporeal or incorporeal, which have not the character of
immovables by their nature or by the disposition of the law, according to the rules laid
down in this title, are considered as movables."
12. La. Civ. Code art. 1856 (1825), found in 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL
CODES OF LOUISIANA, art. 1862 (J. Dainow ed.) [hereinafter cited as COMPILED EDITON].
13. Id.: "La lesion ne peut 6tre alldgude par les personnes majeures dans aucune
autre vente que celles des immeubles, au nombre desquels on doit comprendre tout ce
qui est immeuble par destination, et m~me les esclaves qui sont vendus avec les
habitations, A la culture desquelles ils sont attaches."
14. There is some doubt whether value alone should be the controlling factor.
Baudry-Lacantinerie notes that the debates on the Napoleonic Code lesion articles
included discussion of whether sales of "important movables" should be included. He
quotes the statement of a commentator of the time which may roughly be translated
as follows: "How an individual disposes of diamonds or paintings is of little import-
ance; but the manner in which he disposes of his territorial property is not indifferent
to society. It is the duty of society to place certain limits on the right to dispose of such
property." BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE n' 678.
15. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2589: "If the vendor has been aggrieved for more than half
the value of an immovable estate by him sold, he has the right to demand the rescission
of the sale, even in case he had expressly abandoned the right of claiming such rescis-
sion, and declared that he gave to the purchaser the surplus of the thing's value."
16. Id. art. 2591: "If it should appear that the immovable estate has been sold for
less than one-half its just value, the purchaser may either restore the thing and take
back the price which he has paid, or made up the just price and keep the thing."
17. Id. art. 2592: "Should the purchaser prefer to keep the thing by making up
the just price, he must pay the interest of the additional price from the day when the
rescission was demanded. If he chooses rather to restore the thing and to receive the
purchase money, he shall be liable to restore the fruits of the estate from the day of
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for the proposition that "estate" in Louisiana means a "distinct cor-
poreal immovable." What the court does not note is that in the
French text of articles 2589 and 2591, the word used is simply
immeuble,5 a word which translates as "immovable," in distinction
from the word hbritage,5 which translates as "estate," and which was
in fact the word discussed in the Yiannopoulos article.2" And it does
not note that the French text of article 2592 does not use any words
that can fairly be translated as "estate."'"
The point of all this is that there is really no clear indication in
the Civil Code that the redactors meant to exclude immovables by
the object to which they apply from the action for lesion beyond
moiety. If anything, the evidence points in the opposite direction.
But, as the appellate court properly notes, the Louisiana supreme
court has on two separate occasions indicated that lesion beyond
moiety does not apply to sales of incorporeal immovables. In both
cases, the objects conveyed were rights in minerals, and both courts
regarded the value of these rights as "speculative." In the first case,
it was in fact impossible to estimate whether the vendor had received
less than one-half the value of the thing sold, since the right to de-
velop the minerals was still in existence, and he had a one-eighth
interest in any minerals which might be developed. In the second
case, 23 which in fact was decided on grounds other than lesion beyond
moiety, the court was of the opinion that the reason for the decision
the demand, but the interest of his money shall also be paid to him from the same
time."
18. La. Civ. Code art. 2567 (French text of 1825), found in COMPILED EDITION art.
2589: "Si le vendeur a 6t6 ls6 de plus de moiti6 dans le prix d'un immeuble, il a le
droit de demander la rescision de la vente, quand bien mgme il aurait exprdssement
renounc6 dans le contrat A la facult6 de demander cette rescision, et qu'il aurait ddclar6
donner la plus value."
La. Civ. Code art. 2589 (French text of 1825), found in COMPILED EDITION art. 2591:
"Si l'immeuble se trouve vendu a moins de la moiti6 du juste prix, lacqudreur a Is
choix, ou de rendre Ia chose en retirant le prix qu'il en a pay6, ou de parfaire le juste
prix et de garder la chose."
19. Cf. COMPILED EDITION art. 646 et seq. which uniformly uses the word heritage
in the French and "estate" in the English translation.
20. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles: Louisiana and Com-
parative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1968).
21. La. Civ. Code art. 2570 (French text of 1825), found in COMPILED EDITION art.
2592: "Si I'acqudreur opte de garder la chose en suppldant le juste prix, il doit l'intdr~t
du suppldment, du jour de Ia demande en rescision.
"S'il prdf~re la rendre et recevoir le prix, il rend les fruits du jour de la demanda,
et l'intdr~t du prix qu'il a pay6 lui est aussi compt6 du jour de la m~me demande."
22. Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 99 So. 607 (1924).
23. Haas v. Cerami, 201 La. 612, 10 So. 2d 61 (1942).
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in the first case was that the mineral interest was "essentially specu-
lative."
One need not regard these two cases as requiring the decision
rendered in the instant case, for several reasons. First, they can easily
be distinguished. The remarks in Wilkins are probably dicta because
the rights in question had been conveyed to a third party and because
plaintiff (due to the outstanding royalty he might receive) could not
establish that he had received less than half the value of the thing
sold. The decision in Haas was not even based on the lesion articles,
but rather on article 2464, requiring that the price of a sale not be
out of all proportion to the value of the thing sold. Second, as the
court noted in Haas, transactions concerning mineral rights are es-
sentially speculative and for that reason are aleatory contracts. Such
contracts, even those with immovable property as their subject mat-
ter, have never been considered by the French as subject to the action
for lesion beyond moiety. 4 The reason is simple: the risk that the
buyer takes in such a contract ought to be accompanied by an appro-
priate diminution in price."
A diminution in price in mineral contracts is appropriate not
only because the buyer takes a risk that his purchase might be worth
nothing, but also because the vendor normally has the opportunity
to receive, in addition to the price of the sale, a share of the minerals
found. On the other hand, there is little speculation in the value of a
utility right-of-way. Vendors of such rights-of-way do not stand to
share in any profits gained from the enterprise, and it does not appear
that the purchasers of such rights-of-way encounter any particular
risks as to the purchase itself. Thus it would not be appropriate to
exclude sales of rights-of-way from lesion actions on the theory that
such sales are aleatory.
It is also not proper to reason that since sales of mineral rights
are not subject to actions for lesion beyond moiety, and since mineral
rights are incorporeal immovables, then incorporeal immovables in
general should not be subject to actions for lesion beyond moiety. The
reason that sales of mineral rights might properly be treated as not
subject to actions for lesion, is not because mineral rights are incorpo-
real immovables, but because the contracts are aleatory.
Recognition of this principle would free the courts to extend
actions for lesion beyond moiety to sales of incorporeal immovables,
Such a result would be in accord with the French treatment of the
24. 5 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS n* 358 (6th ed. Esmein 1946); BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE 682; GUILLOUARD 695; TROPLONG 790.
25. TROPLONG 790.
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concepts of aleatory contracts and incorporeal immovables. It would
also permit conveyances of mineral rights to be accorded a different
status, if desired, without doing violence to the concept of the appli-
cability of lesion beyond moiety to sales of all three kinds of immov-
able property. The new Mineral Code apparently takes this view.15.1
Measure of Damages
In Banks v. Johns,"6 in rejecting an alternate claim of lesion
beyond moiety, the First Circuit Court of Appeal declared that the
Civil Code allows "the seller in a lesionary transaction to recover from
the purchaser who has sold the property the profit which the pur-
chaser has realized from the transaction. In this case, [the pur-
chaser] realized no profit, so there can be no recovery on this
ground. 2 7 The court cites as authority for this proposition the rela-
tively recent decision of the Louisiana supreme court in O'Brien v.
Legette.8 On this point, the O'Brien decision may be in error and it
is unfortunate that such citations may begin to establish a line of
authority without examination of the original decision.
The facts in O'Brien v. Legette were simple. Plaintiff conveyed
an immovable to defendant vendee for $12,800. Defendant resold the
immovable to a third party for $30,000. Plaintiff filed suit against
both defendant and the third party, alleging that the immovable was
worth $34,500 at the time of sale and that the sale should be rescinded
on grounds of lesion beyond moiety. The third party was dismissed
from the suit on a motion for summary judgment, since it is estab-
lished that the action for rescission does not extend to a third party
purchaser. 9 Defendant vendee filed an exception of no cause of ac-
tion, claiming that his sale of the immovable to the third party termi-
nated the possibility of an action of lesion. The exception was sus-
tained by both the trial court and the court of appeal, but the su-
preme court reversed, deciding that plaintiff was entitled to maintain
his action against defendant vendee, and remanded the case for trial.
In its opinion, the supreme court clearly indicated that the proper
measure of damages on remand would be the "profit" which the
vendee made, and not the difference between the original sale price
and the just price.3 In plain terms, the damage would likely be the
difference between $12,800 and $30,000 rather than the difference
25.1. LA. R.S. 31:17 (Supp. 1975).
26. 289 So. 2d 194 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
27. Id. at 198.
28. 254 La. 252, 223 So. 2d 165 (1969).
29. Snoddy v. Brashear, 3 La. Ann. 569 (1848).
30. 254 La. at 258, 223 So. 2d at 168.
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between $12,800 and $34,500, the alleged just price.
The court based its remarks on article 2597 of the Civil Code,
which reads:
The seller who demands the rescission on account of lesion
beyond moiety, must resume the possession of the thing, in the
state in which it is.
The buyer, in this case, is not bound for the injury sustained
through his fault before the demand. He is only bound to make
reimbursement for such injuries as he has turned to his own
profit. (Emphasis added.)
It will be seen that by its own terms, article 2597 addresses itself
only to the buyer's obligations in the case in which the seller resumes
possession of the immovable. This was not the case in O'Brien. Pos-
session of the immovable was in the hands of a third party, and not
subject to disturbance either by the original seller or the original
buyer. Clearly, article 2597 did not apply to the case before the court
in O'Brien.31
The confusion on the subject seems to arise from the fact that
the Louisiana code articles on the subject pointedly exclude a sen-
tence in the corresponding article of the Code Napoleon granting an
action against a third party purchaser who has bought the immovable
in question from the original vendee.3 When such a subsequent con-
veyance has in fact occurred, rescission is no longer a viable remedy
for the original vendor. Unlike the original vendor in France, the
Louisiana plaintiff is reduced to a claim against the original vendee
for a monetary award to repair the injury he has suffered. However,
the Louisiana Civil Code offers no specific guidance on the measure
of that injury. Understandably, the Code Napoleon can offer little
assistance, since its primary remedy was and is an action of rescission
against the possessor of the property, who always retains the option
of returning the property or restoring the just price."
31. Accord, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969
Term-Property, 30 LA. L. REV. 181, 196 (1969); Note, 30 LA. L. Rav. 727, 735 (1970).
32. Compare LA. CIv. CODE art. 2591: "If it should appear that the immovable
estate has been sold for less than one-half its just value, the purchaser may either
restore the thing and take back the price which he has paid, or make up the just price
and keep the thing," with CODE NA'oLoN art. 1681 (1804): "In the case in which the
action of rescission is allowed, the purchaser may either restore the thing and take back
the price which he has paid, or keep the property and pay the remainder of the just
price, under deduction of one-tenth of the total price. The third possessor has the same
right, saving to him his warranty against his vendor." (Translation supplied.)
33. CODE NAPOLEON art. 1681 (1804) requires that the possessor of the immovable
give back the thing and take back the price he has paid; or pay the remainder of the
just price (less 10%), and keep the thing. See note 32 supra.
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The best guidance which the Louisiana Civil Code offers on the
question of the measure of damage awardable to the seller when the
purchaser has further conveyed the immovable in question is article
2591, which offers the original purchaser the option of retaining the
immovable and making up the "just price," or returning the immova-
ble and taking back the price which he has paid. Since once the
immovable is conveyed to a third party, the action is limited to the
original purchaser, the article could only be applied to that original
purchaser. It has been asserted that by conveying the property to a
third party, the original purchaser exercises his option, and limits his
response in a lesion action brought by the seller to the remaining
choice-making up the just price and keeping what he has exchanged
for the immovable, namely the price he received from the third
party." This appears to be the correct approach.
One objection to this approach is that it might require the origi-
nal vendee to pay more in compensation to the original vendor than
he received as a profit on his own sale to a third party. Suppose A
sells an immovable worth $20,000 to B for $8,000, and B re-sells the
same immovable to C for $14,000. In an action by A against B, should
A receive a judgment for $12,000 (the difference between the actual
price and the just price) or for $6,000 (the difference between the
34. See Note, 43 TuL. L. REv. 435 (1969) (commenting on decision of First Circuit
Court of Appeal affirming the district court's sustaining of defendant's exception of
no cause of action). It is suggested in Note, 30 LA. L. REv. 727 (1970), that the supreme
court's decision in O'Brien is correct because the history and sources of article 2591
indicate that the only obligation owed by the purchaser is return of the immovable,
and that therefore there is no action by the seller to require a supplement to the price.
It is true that many French writers assert that the seller can only demand return of
the immovable, but these statements are made in the context of determining whether
the action of the seller is movable or immovable and whether the obligation of the
purchaser is an alternative obligation. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE 688; MARCADE 1682.
It does not follow that there would then not be any possibility for the seller to maintain
an action for a supplement in price. The French writers emphasize the distinction that
the seller cannot demand the supplement in price because the Code Napoleon grants
to the purchaser the option to restore the thing or pay the just price less 10%. Since
the action extends in France to any possessor, the option would always be available,
leading unavoidably to the conclusion that the seller could only demand rescission,
leaving the purchaser with the option of complying with the demand or terminating
the action by giving a supplement in price less 10%. Judgments ordering only the
return of the property and leaving the original purchaser with the option of supple-
menting the just price within a certain time period are commonly rendered in Louis-
iana. See, e.g., Batton v. Batton, 11 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). It must be
remembered that in Louisiana, the action does not extend to any possessor, and the
French writings on the subject cannot be said to be apposite. In effect,the purchaser
in Louisiana has exercised his option when he resells, indicating that if any action is
brought by the seller, his response will of necessity be a supplement in price.
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actual price and the re-sale price, i.e., the profit realized by B)? It is
submitted that the answer should be $12,000.11 To those who say that
this is "inequitable, '36 the simple answer would seem to be that the
Code is rather plain on the subject. It does not say, in article 2591,
that the purchaser must pay the profit he has realized; it says that
he must "make up the just price" if his choice is to keep the thing.
After all, one should not lose sight of the fact that if the seller has
convinced the court that in fact the sale was lesionary, it was the
purchaser and not the seller who caused the injury in question, and
it is not at all an unusual principle that he who is responsible at law
for an injury should repair it rather than simply offering whatever
profit he may have realized from the injury. 7
Availability Against Third Parties
It seems well established that the action for lesion beyond moiety
is not available against a third party who has purchased the immova-
ble from the original vendee.3" This is apparently true even if the third
35. This was in fact what was held in the much-cited case of Snoddy v. Brashear,
13 La. Ann. 469 (1858), on its second appearance before the Lousiana supreme court.
The court had previously remanded the case to obtain further evidence as to the
question whether the third-party purchaser was in good faith. 3 La. Ann. 569 (1848).
The lower court found that she was, and the supreme court affirmed that decision. The
action then was one against only the original purchaser, as to whom the court said:
"The liability of C. D. Brashear is, to make up the supplement of the price . . . "
(Emphasis added.) 13 La. Ann. at 471. It appeared that the price actually paid for
immovable was $300. The trial court on remand had found that the just price was
$5,000 and ordered the original purchaser to pay the seller $4,700. However, the su-
preme court determined that the just price was $1,500, and accordingly reversed the
trial court on that point and granted the seller a judgment against the original pur-
chaser in the amount of $1,200- the difference between the sale price and the just
price.
The same principle was earlier announced in Bradford's Heirs v. Brown, 11 Mart.
(O.S.) 217, 221-22 (1922): "The vendee of an estate cannot be disturbed on. the score
of lesion, in the sale, by which his vendor acquired it. The sale is not therefore void,
and if the first vendor wishes to avail himself of the benefit of the law, he must bring
suit to have the act set aside, giving his own vendee the option of paying the difference
between the just price and that which was paid." (Emphasis added.) See also Johnson
v. Johnson, 191 La. 408, 185 So. 299 (1938) and Brandon v. Slade, 122 La. 395, 47 So.
694 (1908), which use precisely the same measure of damages.
36. Note, 43 TUL. L. REv. 435, 439 (1969).
37. Cf. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315 (in pertinent part): "Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
38. The case usually cited for this proposition is Snoddy v. Brashear, 3 La. Ann.
569 (1848). In that case, plaintiff was suing a husband and wife for the return of the
immovable. It had first been sold to the husband and then at a sheriffs sale, to the
wife. The court noted that article 1871 of the Civil Code of 1825 (and more specifically,
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party is aware at the time of his purchase that the original vendee
has obtained the property for a lesionary price.3"
There is some difficulty, however, in deciding when a purchaser
is actually a "third party." In one case, it was alleged by plaintiff that
the original vendee, an individual, had conveyed the property in
question to a corporation of which the vendee was the "head and
leading spirit" and that the vendee and the corporation were in fact
"one and the same."' 0 The court called that contention a "conclusion
of the pleader," recognizing that in fact the corporation and the indi-
vidual were to be "regarded in law" as distinct and separate entities
and "for the purposes of this suit, a third person."" Thus, it seemed
that in theory, transfer from the original vendee, an individual, to a
corporation formed by him might remove the property from the possi-
bility of an action for lesion beyond moiety by the original vendor.
Perhaps the decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in
Evergreen Plantation, Inc. v. Zunamon"2 is not a departure from this
narrow view of "third party" status, but it does provoke some thought
on the subject. The instant decision is only one stage of lengthy
proceedings. 3 The current struggle involved the correctness of excep-
tions of no cause or right of action, and of prescription, which had
been sustained by the trial court as to plaintiffs' suit for rescission of
a sale on grounds of lesion beyond moiety.
It appeared from the allegations of plaintiffs' amended petition
that the timber which was the object of the original sale was conveyed
by the original vendee (Chicago Mill and Lumber Company, a corpo-
ration) to the defendant Zunamon. It was alleged that Zunamon was
article 2569 of the Civil Code of 1825) which grant the action of lesion against the
original vendee, were drawn from article 1681 of the Code Napoleon, but with the
significant omission of any mention of an action against a third party, as found in the
French Civil Code.
39. Morgan v. O'Bannon & Julien, 125 La. 367, 370-71, 51 So. 293, 294 (1910): "A
vendee who has paid a fair and adequate price should not be dispossessed of his title
on the ground that a vendor in a prior sale has chosen to part with his title for an
insufficient price. . . . Lastly, the bad faith charged by plaintiff against [the third
party purchaser] presents the important question for decision. The want of good faith,
as we interpret the petition, consisted in the fact that the [third party purchaser]
knew of the price and that it was inadequate. That knowledge of itself is not sufficient
to render an owner, who is an innocent third person, liable to an action of lesion in a
purchase of property for value which his vendor bought for less than one-half of its
value."
40. Wilkins v. Nelson, 155 La. 807, 814, 99 So. 607, 609 (1924).
41. Id. at 814-15, 99 So. at 609.
42. 291 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
43. See also 272 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973); 197 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1967).
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the "mere nominee" in this conveyance for certain stockholders of
Chicago Mill and Lumber Company, who thereafter formed a com-
mercial partnership which operated under the same trade name as
the original vendee, employed a number of the same persons em-
ployed by the corporation and "operated the identical businesses in
the same manner as did the predecessor corporation,"" including
exploitation of the timber resource in question. Thus, according to
the plaintiffs, defendant was not a "good faith third party purchaser
for valuable consideration."' 5
Citing the definition of a nominee as a person designated to act
for another as his representative,"8 the Second Circuit concluded that
a nominee is only an "alter ego" of the person he represents, and that
such a person stands in the same position as the represented person.
Accordingly, it was concluded that the action of lesion beyond moiety
would be as good against him as it would be against the original
vendee.
Now that it is possible for one person to form a corporation in
Louisiana, 7 it is interesting to speculate whether a one-man corpora-
tion will be considered under certain circumstances an "alter ego" of
the original individual vendee in a lesion beyond moiety action so
that the action might be available against such a "third party" pur-
chaser; 8 or whether the courts will continue to follow the more narrow
position taken up to now.
"IMPERFECT" SOLIDARITY
There are certain doctrines in Louisiana law which, although
they seem to have no basis in the legislation and suffer periods of
repose from time to time, always seem to re-surface as vital as ever.
44. 291 So. 2d at 415-16.
45. Id. at 416.
46. The court drew this definition from BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1200 (4th ed.
1951).
47. LA. R.S. 12:21 (Supp. 1968).
48. Cf Keller v. Haas, 202 La. 486, 12 So. 2d 238 (1943), where it was claimed
that one of the defendants, a corporation, was an innocent purchaser of certain prop-
erty on the faith of the public records and was not affected by the unregistered equities
of co-owners. The court said: "Under the allegations in the plaintiffs' petition, the
business carried on by the corporation is nothing more than a continuation of Haas's
business by the merger of his private business into a corporation of which he is the
managing head and practically the sole owner. Under such circumstances, Haas is not
permitted to cloak himself behind the corporate entity to shield himself from responsi-
bility." Id. at 492-93, 12 So. 2d at 240.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35
One of these is the concept of imperfect solidarity, "re-discovered"
this term in Commercial Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Wilson." Plaintiff
insurance agency sued the defendant for certain unpaid insurance
premiums, which it had paid on his behalf to the insurer. One of
several defenses urged was that plaintiff was neither conventionally
nor legally subrogated to the rights of the insurer (to whom the prem-
iums were paid by plaintiff) and thus had no right of action against
defendant. Solution of this issue turned upon the question of whether
the defendant and the agency were solidarily liable, so that, under
article 2161(3),"o the agency would be legally subrogated to the rights
of the insurer when the agency paid defendant's debt."
The agency adduced evidence that its contract with the insurer52
made it liable under the conditions present in this case to pay the
premiums, and thus it became liable along with defendant for the
debt. Defendant insisted that even if this were the case, this would
not constitute solidary liability as defined by the Code, and empha-
sized language in a recent supreme court case53 which appeared to
require solidarity before article 2161(3) could be satisfied and legal
subrogation could exist. 4 The appellate court offered its opinion that
the language quoted by defendant was dicta,55 but that in any event,
plaintiff and defendant were at least bound in imperfect solidarity,
49. 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
50. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2161: "Subrogation takes place of right: . . . (3) For the
benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of a debt,
had an interest in discharging it."
51. It was undisputed by plaintiff that there was no conventional subrogation.
52. In pertinent part, the contract stated:
"Non-Responsibility of Agent: If written notificacation is given THE COMPANY
of collection difficulties within the time specified below, THE AGENT will be relieved
of responsibility to pay premiums in the following instances:
(a) Fifty days after effective date of renewal bond premium, or
(b) Thirty days after receipt by THE AGENT of premium charges resulting from
audits or interim reports.
Failure of THE AGENT to give THE COMPANY such written notice of his inability
to collect such premiums shall constitute acceptance by THE AGENT of responsibility
to pay such premiums, including the accumulated premiums earned on the insured's
current and renewal policies written subject to audit." 293 So. 2d at 249.
53. Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502
(1969).
54. Id. at 515: "The subcontractors maintain, however, they fulfill all require-
ments for subrogation under Subparagraph 3 [of Article 2161], declaring that subro-
gation takes place of right in favor of him, who 'being bound with others' pays the debt
that he had an interest in discharging. Clearly this language presupposes the existence
of a solidary obligation. If no solidary obligation exists, subrogation does not take
place."
55. In fact the Eanes court decided that the subcontractor and the owner were
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and that this would be sufficient to permit legal subrogation to
occur. 
5
In its opinion in Wilson, the court cites the well-worn language
of Gay & Co. v. Blanchard which is always pointed to as the source
of the concept of imperfect solidarity in Louisiana:
Solidarity may be perfect or imperfect. It is perfect, and the
obligors are the mandataries of each other, when by the same act,
at the same time, they bind themselves to the performance of the
same thing. It is imperfect (and they are not mandataries of each
other) when they bind themselves to the same thing by different
acts or at different times.57
The credit, or blame, for the distinction is normally given to the
Romans, 5s and comes to us more directly from our friends, the
French.59 The entire matter has been the subject of some debate both
in France60 and here. It seems generally agreed that neither the
French nor the Louisiana Civil Code specifically mentions the no-
tion.6' It seems also generally agreed that, as a practical matter, the
never co-obligors at all, so the question of whether article 2161(3) requires solidarity
(when there is an obligation) would appear to be immaterial.
56. On this point, the opinion seems correct. See Howe v. Frazer, 2 Rob. 424 (La.
1842), an interesting case in which the surety on an appeal bond had been compelled
to satisfy plaintiff's judgment and was held to be subrogated to plaintiff's rights
against the surety on the bail bond which had permitted defendant Frazer to be
released from debtor's prison. The court said: "It is not very clear that the parties are
bound with each other, for they did not bind themselves together. They were, however,
certainly bound for the same debt, which forms a third category [under Article
2161(3)], the first being a binding for another, the second with another, the third for
the same debt as another." Id. at 426. See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for 1966-1967 Term-Insurance, 28 LA. L. REv. 372, 373 (1968): "Whether
solidarity is perfect or imperfect, a co-debtor who pays the debt, being bound for or
with another, or for the same debt as another, is entitled to legal subrogation." On the
larger point of whether solidarity itself is required to satisfy the article, it would appear
that by definition, this is the casd: if there is no solidarity (perfect or imperfect), then
one is not bound "with others" for "a debt," but rather only for his share of a debt.
The French are in agreement that either perfect or imperfect solidarity is envisioned
for this type of legal subrogation to occur. 4 AUBRY AND RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS n o
329 (1902); 2 MAZEAUD & MAZEAUD, LEqONS DE DROIT CIVIL n ° 1072 (4th ed. 1969); 2
PLAINOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 501, at 282 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
57. 32 La. Ann. 497, 502 (1880).
58. See Comment, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217, 220 (1951), and authorities there collected.
59. See, e.g., 4 MARCADE, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL n 0 1201 (5th ed. 1852).
60. Plainol, for example, is critical of the concept. 2 PLAINOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
pt. 1, no. 777, at 417 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) citing authorities.
61. It has been suggested that in article 254 (now repealed) and article 457, the
redactors of the Louisiana Civil Code intended by their reference to liability "in soli-
dum" in the English text to establish the concept of imperfect solidarity. E. SAUNDERS,
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only difference between perfect and imperfect solidarity (after crea-
tion of the solidarity) is that there seems to be no interruption of
prescription in the latter situation when one of the co-debtors is sued
on the obligation.2 In the few cases in which imperfect solidarity has
actually been found, it appears that a finding of perfect solidarity
would have yielded the same result. 3 And in at least one case where
the doctrine of imperfect solidarity could have been quite useful, the
court refused to use it," and one of its erstwhile supporters, 5 while
mentioning it, seemed to indicate that he no longer thought it had
any validity."
Such, in brief, is the checkered history of imperfect solidarity.
The immediate question is whether the concept is currently useful.
It should be recalled that in both Roman and French law, the "per-
fect" solidary obligation was theoretically one formed by persons who
were presumed to have frequent dealings with each other and com-
mon interests, and who desired to be bound together as a unit. Thus
it was concluded that they were theoretically mandataries of each
other, an important conclusion which led logically to the principles
that the release of one of the "perfect" solidary co-debtors would
release the other, and that the interruption of prescription as to one
LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE OF LOUISIANA 427 (Bonomo ed. 1925); Comment, 25 TUL.
L. REv. 217, 230 (1951). This seems doubtful for two reasons. First, the redactors were
certainly capable of making specific and detailed reference to imperfect solidarity if
they desired to do so. Second, the English-Latin phrase "in solidum" in these two
articles is a translation from the French solidairement, a word quite uniformly used
elsewhere in the code and translated elsewhere as "in solido." It is remarkable, how-
ever, that article 254 (now repealed) translated solidairement as "in solidum," and the
subject matter of article 254 was one in which the French found imperfect, rather than
perfect, solidarity. See Comment, 25 TUL. L. REv. 217, 226 n.93 (1951).
62. See, e.g., Granger v. General Motors Corp., 171 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965); Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957);
Bonacorso v. Turnley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
63. See, e.g., Cline v. Crescent City R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 1031, 6 So. 851 (1889);
Howe v. Frazer, 2 Rob. 424 (La. 1842); Bonacorso v. Turnley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957).
64. Wooten v. Wimberly, 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231 (1974).
65. Mr. Justice Tate, whose opinions in Dupre v. Consolidated Underwriters, 99
So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957) and Bonacorso v. Turnley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1957) contributed to the growth of the concept of imperfect solidarity.
66. In a footnote in his concurring opinion in Wooten v. Wimberly, Mr. Justice
Tate says: "Although the writer notes this as a possible basis for reaching the same
result as the majority did, it is his personal opinion that the Louisiana Civil Code does
not admit of 'imperfect' solidarity, not referred to at all in the text." 272 So. 2d at 310
n.7.
67. See Comment, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217 (1951); The Work of the Louisiana Appel-
late Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Insurance, 28 LA. L. REy. 372 (1968).
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would interrupt prescription as to the others, since in law each repre-
sented the other. On the other hand, "imperfect" solidarity, if it
occurred, was a creation of the law for its own reasons," and an
assumption of mandate between persons who might well be strangers
to each other was thought to be inappropriate. It would then also be
inappropriate to permit the release of one such co-debtor to operate
the release of the others, or to permit the interruption of prescription
as to one to interrupt prescription as to the others. Thus it was that
at both Roman and French law, the only extinguishment of "imper-
fect" solidarity was complete satisfaction of the creditor; partial pay-
ment and release of one co-debtor would not avail the others, because
they were not thought to have bound themselves as a unit.
The importance of this is to notice that in practice Louisiana
jurisprudence has given recognition to this "assumed mandate"
theory in name only, and has often found perfect solidarity in instan-
ces in which it could not be said that a mandate could be assumed."
The primary effect of either perfect or imperfect solidarity is the
same: any of the debtors may be compelled to pay the whole."0 Extin-
68. It is said by some that the origin of the concept is delictual. See MAZEAUD &
MAZEAUD, LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL no 1071 (4th ed. 1969). Others say it arises in cases
in which it is the purpose of the law to guarantee public safety. Comment, 25 TUL. L.
REV. 217 (1951). Thus it is that the French usually list as examples of imperfect
solidarity the obligation of co-tortfeasors; co-tenants whose leased premises are de-
stroyed by fire (FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1734); the widow who is tutrix of her minor child
and who remarries without the consent of the family meeting, with her second hus-
band, for any damage to the estate of the minor, (LA. Civ. CODE art. 254, repealed
1960); incorporators of a corporation for ultra vires acts. But even in some of these
instances, such as that of co-tortfeasors, the effects of perfect solidarity are accorded
the obligation, since the release of one co-tortfeasor will release the others. 7 PLAINIOL
ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANqAIS n * 1076 (1931).
69. See, e.g., the series of cases in which it has been held that perfect solidarity
exists between an original mortgagor and a debtor who has assumed the notes secured
by the mortgagee: Canal Bank & Trust Co. v. Greco, 177 La. 507, 148 So. 693 (1933);
Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367 (1927); Barnett v. Sandford, 137 So. 566 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1931). Additionally, see the cases in which co-tortfeasors have been
treated as bound in perfect solidarity, though they can hardly be said to be mandatar-
ies of each other: Reid v. Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939); Irwin v. Scribner,
15 La. Ann. 583 (1860); Owen v. Brown, 13 La. Ann. 201 (1858); Franks v. City of
Alexandria, 128 So. 2d 310 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). See also Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122
So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960) (perfect solidarity between an insurer and his
insurer); Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (perfect
solidarity between different liability insurers bound for the same tort obligation). In
these instances, the court rarely refers to "perfect" solidarity, only to solidarity, but it
gives to these instances of what ought to be "imperfect" solidarity (non-mandataries)
effects which are the same as those which would follow a conclusion of perfect solidar-
ity.
70. Flinkote Co. v. Thomas, 223 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (perfect
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guishment of each is the same: payment by, or release of, one of the
co-debtors will release the others, whether the source of the obligation
is contractual7 or delictual. 2 Each produces the other effects of soli-
darity: legal subrogation among the co-debtors,3 raising of defenses
not personal to other co-debtors, 4 all co-debtors may be sued at the
domicile of any of them, 5 the debtors may be sued separately and
judgment obtained against each,7" and so on.
solidarity); Wilks v. Allstate Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) (imperfect
solidarity - two insurers bound for the same tort obligation); LA. CIv. CODE art. 2091.
71. Fridge v. Caruthers, 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924). Or, the solidary obligation
might arise from contract and from tort, as in the instance of the insured who may be
liable to the plaintiff in tort, and the insurer who may be liable to the plaintiff by
contract. See Temple v. Harper, 200 So. 2d 749, 752 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967): "Such
imperfect solidarity may arise from a contract and a tort . . . . [Bloth defendants
are bound to the same obligation, and payment by one exonerates the other from
liability."
72. Reid v. Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939). Cf. Union Nat. Bank v.
Legendre, 35 La. Ann. 787 (1883), in which a certain Morris embezzled funds and a
certain Legendre concealed the theft. Each had provided sureties for faithful perform-
ance of his employment. Two of the sureties of Morris paid $10,000 of the $15,000 debt
and were released. Plaintiff filed suit against the estate of Morris, Legendre and his
sureties. Legendre's sureties claimed that they were solidarily liable with the sureties
of Morris, and that the release of those two sureties released them. The court disagreed,
saying simply: "the relation of solidary obligors inter sese did not exist between the
discharged sureties of Morris and the defendants." Id. at 793. Compare the Legendre
case with Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). In Tabb, plaintiff
sought recovery for injuries suffered from a gunshot wound inflicted by Norred (a
minor), from Norred, Norred's father and their liability insurer as well as from Vincent
(another minor), Vincent's father and their liability insurer. Plaintiff's theory was that
the two minors were joint tortfeasors and solidarily liable. The Norreds and their
insurer settled with plaintiff and were released. The trial court judgment against the
Vincents and their insurer condemned them to pay the entire damage, but permitted
the principal amount to be reduced by one-half as to the minor, because his co-
tortfeasor Norred had settled. The same right was not given to Vincent's father, and
thus the plaintiff sought to receive the entire amount from Vincent's father and the
insurer. The court rejected that proposal, saying that the fathers were solidarily liable
between themselves, and that Vincent, Sr. was thus entitled to a reduction in the
amount payable of one-half. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1972-1973 Term - Obligations, 34 LA. L. REv. 231, 236-37 (1974).
73. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2161(3); Howe v. Frazer, 2 Rob. 424 (La. 1842) (imperfect
solidarity); Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974) (imperfect solidarity).
74. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2098; Hennen v. Bourgeat, 12 Rob. 522 (La. 1846) (perfect
solidarity); Edwards v. Royal Indem., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935) (imperfect
solidarity); Nations v. Morris, 331 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1971).
75. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 73; Wisemore v. First Nat. Life Ins. Co., 190 La. 1011,
183 So. 247 (1938) (imperfect solidarity; master and servant sued in tort); Canal Bank
& Trust Co. v. Greco, 177 La. 507, 148 So. 693 (1933) (imperfect solidarity; mortgagor
and assumer).
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All of these results obtain whether the solidarity is perfect or
imperfect. The only aberration appears to be the jurisprudential rule
that when the solidarity is imperfect, there is no interruption of pre-
scription as to the other co-debtors when one co-debtor is sued or
acknowledges the debt, and even in that instance the cases are not
consistent." In fact, specific holdings that in the case before the court
the debtors are bound in imperfect solidarity and some are thus dis-
charged because prescription was not interrupted as to them are rare
indeed.T
It is submitted that the inapplicability of the secondary effect of
interruption of prescription as to those bound in imperfect solidarity
might have been justified if the "assumed mandate" theory were
actually used in Louisiana and clearly distinguished between perfect
and imperfect solidarity, in order that persons otherwise possibly
strangers might not have their affairs so intimately joined together
by the law. But as a practical matter, the law has not distinguished
strangers who find themselves solidarily liable from parties who
choose to so bind themselves and become mandataries for each other;
76. This is the case since only actual satisfaction, as opposed to mere judgment
in his favor, will satisfy the creditor. Dussuau v. Rilieux, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 318 (La. 1821);
LA. CIv. CODE art. 2095; Bonacorso v. Turfiley, 98 So. 2d 295 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
(imperfect solidarity; buyer and seller of real estate bound at different times for bro-
ker's commission); Sewell v. Newton, 152 So. 389 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934) (imperfect
solidarity; insured and insurer).
77. See, e.g., Rhys v. Moody, 163 La. 1039, 113 So. 367 (1927), where the obliga-
tion was said to be in solido between the mortgagor and the assumer and the acknowl-
edgement of the latter was held to interrupt prescription as to the former. See also
Barnett v. Sandford, 137 So. 566 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1931).
78. There are only a few instances in which the discussion of imperfect solidarity
is not dicta. And there are even fewer instances in which there is a holding which
concludes that there is imperfect solidarity and that for that reason, some of the co-
debtors are released because there was no interruption of prescription as to them. In
fact, the only such cases appear to be early ones in which it was held that the endorser
of a note was bound only in imperfect solidarity with the maker, and that acknowledg-
ment by the maker would not interrupt prescription as to the endorser. See Hickman
v. Stafford, 2 La. Ann. 792 (1847); McCalop v. Newcomb, 2 La. Ann. 332 (1847); Jacobs
v. Williams, 12 Rob. 183 (La. 1845). These cases, of course, antedated the adoption of
the Negotiable Instruments Law and the widespread use of a clause in promissory
notes which usually reads in a fashion similar to the following: "The makers, endorsers,
guarantors, and sureties of this note hereby agree to be bound in solido with the maker,
and each other, and as original promissors, on this note .... See S. P. Weaver Lumber
& Supply Co. v. Ashford, 12 So. 2d 834 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
In one case, the court considered and rejected an argument that co-tortfeasors
were bound only in imperfect solidarity and thus the service of process on one did not
interrupt prescription as to the other, but it stated that if imperfect solidarity had been
found, the result would have been different. Grigsby v. Morgan & Lindsey, 148 So. 506
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1933).
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and accordingly no distinction should be made between them. The
doctrine of imperfect solidarity might be retained as a distinction in
the manner in which solidary obligations may be created but there
is no reason to decide that it should produce different effects there-
after.7"
MISCELLANEOUS
During the last term, the appellate courts made interesting use
of the doctrine of vice of consent to rescind certain contracts. In
Marcello v. Bussiere,0 the defendants, an elderly couple, moved to
Louisiana and sought to invest in a small business which would afford
them some security in their retirement years. This was made known
to an insurance agent, who put them in contact with the plaintiff,
who "held the lease"'" on certain premises which had been operated
as a cocktail lounge. After negotiation, it was agreed that plaintiff
would sell the business and the equipment on the premises to the
defendants for $6500, and that plaintiff and defendants would sign a
two-year lease on the premises at $250 per month. Defendants soon
paid the $6500, as well as rent and utilities for two months, and
conducted extensive renovation of the premises. To their dismay,
they learned that the alcoholic beverage license which had been re-
voked some six months prior to the date of their negotiations, would
not be renewed, apparently due to the opposition of the city chief of
police, whose approval was at least informally required.
When the third month's rent was not forthcoming, the plaintiff
requested that it be paid and was informed by defendants that no
more payments would be made. Plaintiff then instituted suit against
defendants, seeking the unpaid balance on the two-year lease. Defen-
dants reconvened, seeking rescission of the sale and lease because of
fraud82 or error and damages against plaintiff and the insurance
agent.
79. The distinction on the basis of assumed mandate has been criticized as false,
"[since] it is not from a mandate to contract the debt, that the secondary effects
result, but rather from a sort of community of interests which, once created establishes
the solidarity between them; this kind of association of solidary co-debtors can exist
no matter what the source of the debt." 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 778
(lth ed. La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
80. 284 So. 2d 892 (La. 1973).
81. The phrase is the court's. It appears from the appellate court's decision that
Marcello was in fact the lessee of the premises and was to sub-lease them to the
defendants. Marcello v. Bussiere, 269 So. 2d 285, 286 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
82. Neither the appellate court nor the supreme court could find that the evidence
established fraud on the part of plaintiff. Marcello v. Bussiere, 269 So. 2d 285, 288 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1972); 284 So. 2d 892, 894 (La. 1973).
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The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff for one
month's rent but denied the remainder of the requested relief; it
granted judgment in defendants' favor on the reconventional de-
mand, rescinding the sale and returning the purchase price. 3 The
appellate court reversed the judgment on the reconventional demand,
upholding the sale of the business. 4
The Louisiana supreme court reversed and rendered judgment
rejecting plaintiff's main demand, granting the reconventional de-
mand made by defendants, rescinding the sale and lease and con-
demning plaintiff to pay $6500 (the purchase price) to defendants.
The court found that the determining motive for the contract, from
defendants' point of view, was to secure a going bar-lounge business
for their continued operation, and that this motive was "either known
to the seller or, from the circumstances, should have been known to
him." It concluded that, "[I]t makes no difference whether we clas-
sify the error as one of fact or one of both fact and law. The result is
the same. The contracts must be rescinded."8
In Paciera v. Benitz,0 a similar problem was faced. There, plain-
tiff had contracted to buy from defendant a certain boathouse in the
Orleans Marina, for cash and notes. The instrument was styled
"Cash Sale-Movable Property." In fact, it appeared that the boat-
house belonged to the local levee district and was simply leased to
the defendant for a five-year term which had only three months left
to run at the time of the "sale." The trial court had determined that
"no one would pay $13,500 for a boathouse on leased property, the
lease to expire three months after the Act of Sale."" The appellate
court obviously agreed, affirming the declaration of nullity of the
contract by the trial court: "We have no difficulty in concluding with
the trial court that the error of fact here on the part of Mr. Paciera
went to the very essence of the contract and compels a declaration of
nullity."8
On another subject, Edmonston v. A-Second Mortgage Co.8" tells
the common tale of legal relationships strained by financial difficul-
ties. Plaintiff owned some immovable property prior to her marriage.
After the marriage, she and her husband applied for and obtained a
83. 284 So. 2d at 894.
84. 269 So. 2d at 289.
85. 284 So. 2d at 895.
86. 284 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). Although defendant's name is spelled
"Benitz" in the printed caption of the case, it is spelled "Benitez" throughout the
opinion.
87. Id. at 829.
88. Id.
89. 289 So. 2d 116 (La. 1974).
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loan from an insurance company for $16,000, which was secured by a
first mortgage on plaintiff's immovable property and by an "assign-
ment of collateral security" agreement which assigned to the com-
pany the proceeds of two whole life policies, each in the face amount
of $8,000 with a double-indemnity clause in the event of accidental
death, insuring plaintiff and her husband. These were issued by the
same company which made the loan. This agreement provided that
the company would, at the death of either of the insureds, apply the
proceeds to discharge the mortgage or, at its option, would pay the
proceeds to the beneficiary. Plaintiff was named beneficiary on the
policy insuring her husband's life.
Beset by financial difficulties, plaintiff and her husband ar-
ranged for an additional $4,000 loan from A-Second at a later point
in time, securing that loan by a second mortgage on plaintiff's im-
movable property. Still later and still short of money, plaintiff and
her husband conveyed the immovable property to A-Second in a
dation en paiement in return for A-Second's cancellation of the mort-
gage note held by it and its assumption of the payments on the
mortgage note held by the insurance company.
Plaintiff's husband died an accidental death, and by the terms
of the policy, the $16,000 proceeds were payable to her. But by the
terms of the "assignment of collateral security" agreement, the com-
pany applied those proceeds to the balance on the mortgage note held
by it (approximately $14,500) and forwarded the remainder (some
$1,500) to plaintiff. It subsequently occurred to plaintiff that now she
had neither the policy proceeds nor the immovable property, and it
may have occurred to her that she might be entitled to the equivalent
of one or the other.
She brought suit against both the insurance company and A-
Second, praying for judgment in the amount of the balance on the
mortgage note, in the alternative against one or the other of the
defendants. All relief was denied in the trial court and the appellate
court.9 0 The supreme court reversed, however, holding that plaintiff
had stated a cause of action de in rem verso against A-Second, meet-
ing all of the requirements for the correction of an unjust enrich-
ment.' It dismissed her principal demand against the insurance com-
pany. This case and a general discussion of the action de in rem verso
will be the subject of a future student note in this Review.
90. Edmonston v. A-Second Mtg. Co., 273 So. 2d 707 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
91. As set out in the earlier case of Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc., 251 La. 624,
205 So. 2d 422 (1967), these are: (1) there must be an enrichment; (2) there must be
an impoverishment; (3) there must be a connection between the enrichment and the
impoverishment; (4) there must be an absence of justification for the enrichment and
impoverishment, i.e., it must be unjust; and (5) there must be no other remedy at law
available to the plaintiff.
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